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ABSTRACT
Market productivity is often greater, and leisure and other household activities more enjoyable, when
people perform them simultaneously. Beyond pointing out the positive externalities of synchronicity,
economists have not attempted to identify exogenous determinants of timing. We develop a theory
illustrating conditions under which synchronicity will vary and identify three factors — the amount
of daylight, the timing of television programming, and differences in time zones — that can alter
timing. Using the American Time Use Survey for 2003 and 2004, we first show that an exogenous
shock to time in one area due to non-adherence to daylight-saving time leads its residents to alter
their work schedules to continue coordinating their activities with those of people elsewhere. With
time use data from Australia, we also demonstrate the same response to a similar shock there. We
then show that both television timing and the benefits of coordinating across time zones in the U.S.
generally affect the timing of market work and sleep, the two most time-consuming activities people
undertake. While these impacts do not differ greatly by people's demographic characteristics,
workers in industries where we would expect more coordination outside of their local areas are more
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Coordination is central to economic behavior. The production of goods and services typically
requires the services of complementary inputs, including the services of workers of di®erent
types. Firms often cooperate with others in order to maximize their joint pro¯ts. Generating
satisfaction in the household requires purchasing goods and using one's own time and rented
services of others to create a commodity that yields utility (Becker, 1965). Coordination
also underlies policies as policymakers must take into account the interdependence of their
choices. The study of these various types of coordination of the amounts of consumer goods
and producer inputs has formed the basis for much of microeconomic theory, and testing
them and inferring the values of the parameters describing parts of the theories has occupied
a substantial proportion of empirical economists' time for at least half a century.
That every activity implicitly must have a time subscript has entered theoretical analyses
only rarely (but see the excellent exception in Winston, 1982). Using capital services alone
from midnight to noon and labor services alone from noon to midnight will lead to much less
(zero?) output than if both are utilized in the same twelve hours of the day; and production
will probably be higher if workers of di®erent types are on the job at the same time than
if each one works at di®erent times. Firms that cooperate do so in a time dimension, and
the extent of the temporal coordination has macroeconomic impacts (Cooper, 1999). For
most people the services of an automobile are more valuable if they are combined with the
simultaneous inputs of drivers' and passengers' time when the auto is on hand, and the
utility gained by the people involved is usually higher if enjoyed simultaneously.
When activities take place matters, as does the extent of temporal coordination in gener-
ating them. Despite the importance of when cooperating agents engage in various activities,
there has been remarkably little empirical study of the temporal nature of activities and even
less of temporal patterns of coordination. Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) demonstrated how
1government policies can induce ¯rms to undertake decisions about product design at the same
time. Hamermesh (2002) and Hallberg (2003) showed that spouses prefer to work (and en-
gage in household production) at the same times of the day, and that such coordination is a
superior activity. Jenkins and Osberg (2005) demonstrated how an increase in the fraction
of people in a region who engage in a particular leisure activity has positive ceteris paribus
impacts on individuals' choices of leisure activities.
Very little other empirical study of the timing of coordination appears to have been
done. Perhaps part of the reason is that while it is clear that people's synchronization
of their work activities is important (Weiss, 1996), as is their coordination in timing their
non-market activities, it is very di±cult to identify factors that might cause the extent of
synchronization to di®er among di®erent groups of workers and consumers. In this study we
do exactly that: we identify several determinants of temporal coordination that are clearly
external to the agents making the decisions to coordinate. We thus show that the degree
of synchronization does not just happen, but that it results from the gains to coordination
of activities. Temporal coordination can also can be a®ected by cues, both natural and
arti¯cial. The arti¯cial cue we examine here is the timing of television programs, while the
natural cue is circadian rhythm as modi¯ed by daylight (Wever, 1982). We also examine the
importance of coordination that is induced by the gains to simultaneous production across
geographic areas where the nominal time of day di®ers. We refer to these as light, television,
and time zone cues, respectively.
In the next section we develop a simple model that allows us to illustrate some trade-
o®s involved in temporal coordination and to identify instances where we might expect cues
for coordination to be more or less powerful. In Section 3 we describe the nature of the
institutions that generate these cues, while in Section 4 we present the data used to analyze
their importance. Section 5 o®ers the central results of the paper, both the results of a
natural experiment that demonstrates the empirical importance of time zone cues and the
2estimates of models that show the independent importance of all three cues. Section 6
explores how the impacts of these cues vary across demographic and economic groups, while
Section 7 replicates the natural experiment in Section 5 with an Australian data set.
2 Theoretical Model
Scheduling choices likely depend on individual preferences for the timing of activities as well
as for synchronization with parties who are both internal and external to an individual's
geographic area. Our model takes into account the coordination trade-o®s associated with
the timing of activities and then predicts which individuals will be most responsive to the
coordination cues that in°uence the choices of others.
Consider a two-player simultaneous-response model in which there are two periods in
each day and Worker i must engage in market production during one period and household
production during the other. The labor-market productivity of Worker i is determined in
part by coordination e®ects arising from the timing of his activities with both local and
distant market activity. Assume that extra-regional workers choose to work during Period
1 and that Worker i's productivity increases by a factor of ®i ¸ 0 if he chooses to engage
in market work during that period.1 In addition, Worker i's productivity is increased by
a factor of ¯i ¸ 0 if he coordinates intra-regionally by working during the same period as
the other player. Finally, we allow for a desire to coordinate household production with a
non-working spouse during Period 1 by letting labor productivity change by a factor of µi
during Period 2 as a result of worker preferences for the timing of activities. Figure 1 shows
a normal form representation of the payo®s for this game.
Worker i will choose to work during Period 1 if his earnings are higher during that time.
1Note that the sequential choice of scheduling in which external workers have selected to engage in market
activity during Period 1 is a modeling convenience. Similar predictions are obtained by modeling workers in
the regions as making simultaneous scheduling choices but having di®erences in inter-regional cues such as
light.
3Let be y¤
i be the di®erence between Period 1 and Period 2 earnings of Worker i so that
y
¤





0 if otherwise (2)
where
®i = Worker i's increased productivity due to inter-regional coordination
¯i = Worker i's increased productivity due to intra-regional coordination
µi = Worker i's increased (decreased) productivity due to a preference for working during
Period 2 (1)
²i = Shocks to Worker i's relative productivity that are not observed by the economist.
Depending on the preferences of the two workers, this game could result in one of ¯ve
equilibria as represented in Figure 2. The middle square of this ¯gure shows the non-unique
solution (0,0) and (1,1) in which the players will coordinate with each other in either Period
1 or Period 2. The probability that this occurs is
H(®;¯;µ) = (3)
Pr(¡®1 ¡ ¯1 + µ1 · ²1 · ¡®1 + ¯1 + µ1;¡®2 ¡ ¯2 + µ2 · ²2 · ¡®2 + ¯2 + µ2):
Furthermore, let
H1(®;¯;µ) = Pr(²1 · ¡®1 ¡ ¯1 + µ1;²2 ¸ ¡®2 + ¯2 + µ2)
H2(®;¯;µ) = Pr(²1 ¸ ¡®1 + ¯1 + µ1;²2 · ¡®2 + ¡¯2 + µ2)
H3(®;¯;µ) = Pr(²1 ¸ ¡®1 ¡ ¯1 + µ1;²2 ¸ ¡®2 ¡ ¯2 + µ2) (4)




H3 ¡ H < Pr(1;1) < H3 (5)
H4 ¡ H < Pr(0;0) < H4:
(6)
We use Figure 2 and these boundary conditions to examine the impact of changing
parameters on the probabilities of observing di®erent equilibria. Consider ¯rst ®i, the return
to inter-regional coordination. As ®1 increases, Worker 1 is more likely to work during Period
1 either with or without Worker 2. If the two were previously coordinating during Period
2, Worker 1 is more likely to move to Period 1 alone in order to coordinate inter-regionally,
or the two workers might both move to working in Period 1. As ¯i, the return to intra-
regional coordination, increases, the probability that the two workers coordinate in either
period increases. For example, if the two workers were previously not coordinating and ¯1
increases, Worker 1 is more likely to work in the same period as Worker 2. Finally, as µi,
the preference for Period 2 increases, Worker i is more likely to work during Period 2.
As documented in the empirical literature on discrete games of market entry (see, e.g.,
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006)), the existence of a non-unique
solution as represented by the middle square of Figure 2 presents challenges in de¯ning
a likelihood function and empirically identifying the parameters of interest. In our case,
however, we use this type of model only to motivate consideration of incentives for both
local and external coordination. We do not attempt to identify the parameters but only to
infer their relative size by the nature of observed coordination.
In order to do this, we introduce the consideration of \cues" for coordination. We view
cues as the exogenous signals that in°uence timing decisions. For instance, time zones
5may serve as external cues to those who are coordinating with other regions. Those in the
Central time zone may go to work at 8 a.m. because easterners have just arrived at 9 a.m.
in their region. This model implies that individuals who bene¯t more from synchronization
of activities with workers in other regions (high ®i) are more likely to coordinate inter-
regionally. It also indicates that even individuals who derive very small direct bene¯ts from
such coordination may also end up synchronizing with the other region because of the need
to coordinate with other local residents. Hence, a waiter may have a small ®i because his
productivity is not directly dependent on workers in other regions, but a large ¯i because
his productivity is in°uenced by other local residents, such as call center workers. He may
therefore end up rising early because others in his area are doing so. The observer, however,
can only identify that he is responding to a cue for inter-regional coordination, not the
underlying parameter that is driving this response. One interesting way in which insight
might be gleaned, however, is by examining the impact of the cue of television scheduling.
Because we can identify viewers and non-viewers, any impact that television cues have on
non-viewers can be assumed to enter through the need for intra-regional coordination.
If we consider µi as accounting for personal preference for working in Period 2, then
factors that tend to diminish this preference will increase the level to which our worker is
driven by coordination concerns. For instance, to the extent that household production by
an unmarried individual depends less on timing by others in his household, he may be more
likely to engage in inter-regional coordination.
We do not explicitly inquire into the welfare e®ects of changes in coordination that arise
endogenously through changes in the parameters underlying this model. To the extent that
governments can manipulate coordination by altering cues, however, one must conclude that
this can alter welfare. That a number of governments have homogenized timing incentives
within their boundaries suggests at least that people believe greater coordination enhances
6welfare.2
3 Background on Time Zones and Television
The discussion above suggests that we might observe coordination arising from local external
cues, such as television programming and sunlight, and from inter-regional external cues,
such as time zones. In this section we discuss the exogenous determination of these cues.
From early childhood every American knows that the United States is divided into time
zones. What is less known to most Americans is that until the growth of railroad tra±c
after the Civil War scheduling was not uniform, and di®erent areas, even those in close
proximity, operated on di®erent times (O'Malley, 1990). With the Standard Time Act of
1918 the current four contiguous U.S. time zones (Eastern, Central, Mountain and Paci¯c),
were established and have been in e®ect since then, with only minor changes at the edges of
the zones.3 The current division of the country is shown by the state-county map reproduced
in Figure 3. The nominal times in the other three time zones di®er from that in the Eastern
zone at the same real time by one, two and three hours respectively.
Daylight Savings Time (DST) was introduced in the U.S. and many other parts of the
world as an e®ort to save energy during times of war. The U.S. adopted a formal DST plan
in 1918, but it was repealed after the end of World War I because of its inconvenience and
unpopularity. The current U.S. DST plan was signed into law by President Johnson in 1966
as the Uniform Time Act. Each state or possession, however, is able to supersede the law by
passing its own act. Since then, amendments have been enacted to modify DST for states
in multiple time zones and/or to change the beginning and ending dates of DST. Indeed,
2The decision early in the existence of the People's Republic of China to have one time zone covering a
country whose expanse previously had ¯ve time zones was clearly political and designed to enhance control
and perhaps economic well-being. In 1992 Argentina switched from two time zones (with each going on
daylight saving time) to one zone with only standard time, apparently as a coordination mechanism.
3For example, in 2005 there was a proposal to place ¯ve counties in northern Maine in the Atlantic time
zone (with eastern Canada).
7e®ective 2007 the period of DST will be lengthened by four weeks.4
Twelve of the 48 contiguous states are in more than one time zone, as is Alaska (most of
which is one hour behind the Paci¯c zone). All of Hawaii is two hours behind Paci¯c time.
Most of the United States goes on DST in early spring and goes o® it (onto standard time{
hereafter ST) in mid-autumn. Certain areas, particularly the entire states of Arizona and
Hawaii, and many parts of Indiana (including the Indianapolis metropolitan area) remained
on standard time all year at the time our data were collected, although Indiana began
observing DST in 2006.
Most young children in the United States also learn the mantra announcing prime-time
television shows, \10 p.m. Eastern and Paci¯c, 9 p.m. Central and Mountain." Television
shows from late afternoon onwards appear one nominal hour earlier in the middle two time
zones than in the other two zones. This di®erence is a relic of the technology of radio
transmission (Winston, 1998). During the late 1920s, when the radio networks were being
developed, the technology was such that the signals could not be sent across the whole
country. Thus one broadcast was produced and performed live to serve both the Eastern
and Central time zones, appearing at the same real time in both zones, but an hour earlier
in nominal time in the Central zone. For the other two zones (which encompassed at that
time only tiny fractions of the population) the shows were performed live a second time
until re-broadcasts of recorded shows began in the 1940s. The essential point is that the
television time-zone mantra precedes television and was dictated by people's preferences for
live performances at desirable times that are no longer relevant but that still in°uence the
timing of presentations in radio's main successor medium.
4Kamstra et al. (2000) discussed the negative ¯nancial consequences of desynchronization caused by
changing to and from DST. They claimed the existence of losses of tens of billions of dollars in several stock
markets due to switching on and o® DST.
84 Time-Use Data and the Distribution of the Popula-
tion by Time Zone
Most of the analyses that we present are based on the American Time Use Survey, an on-
going Bureau of Labor Statistics e®ort that began in 2003 and that currently collects roughly
13;000 time diaries per year, 1;100 each month, from recent participants in the Current
Population Survey (see Hamermesh et al., 2005, for a description). Each of the selected
respondents (one per CPS household) is asked to complete a diary for the most recent day
(4 a.m.{3:59 a.m.) in which the respondent lists when each activity undertaken began and
what it was. The activities are coded into 406 separate categories. We use data from the
twenty-four months of diaries collected in 2003 and 2004, which yield 20,790 and 13,973
observations respectively. Because the observations are chosen from recent respondents to
the Current Population Survey, all the usual CPS demographic information is available on
the respondents and their spouses and children (if any). In addition to information from
the ATUS and CPS, sunrise and sunset data were collected from the United States National
Observatory website and matched to the day and location of each observation.5
We focus here on three activities: market work, sleeping and watching television. These
activities comprise a large fraction of the typical respondent's day: on a representative day
they totaled 226, 509 and 158 minutes respectively, thus accounting for 62 percent of the
available time on the days surveyed. They are undertaken by 39:7, 99:9 and 78:5 percent of
the sample respectively on the representative day. In addition, these three activities are by
far the most important single activities undertaken, with even television-watching accounting
for over twice as much time as the next most time-consuming activity.
While our use of residents in a particular time zone as ¯rst-movers in our model was an
expositional convenience, in reality the Eastern zone is and has been dominant. As Table
5That daylight a®ects the kinds of activities undertaken is starkly demonstrated by patterns of crime
(Voth, 2000) and people's scheduling activities in response to fears of crime (Hamermesh, 1999).
91 shows, nearly half the country's population is currently in the Eastern zone (and not in
Indiana). That is true today, and its importance was even greater in 1920, the Census year
nearest the date when time zones became more or less ¯xed by statute. The major change
in the past 85 years is that the relative importance of the Eastern and especially the Central
time zone has diminished, with the increase taken up by the Paci¯c zone. Nonetheless, the
Eastern zone remains dominant.
Choosing a sample for the analysis is rendered di±cult by the inability to classify exactly
in which time zone each respondent in the ATUS resides. In the samples used in most of the
analyses for the U.S. we include only those individuals in the contiguous states whose time
zone can be identi¯ed with certainty from the state or metropolitan area where they are
located, and for whom DST applies during part of the year. The distribution of the sample
is shown in Table 1. Six percent of the respondents cannot be classi¯ed, and 0:1 percent
are in Alaska. Ninety-one percent can be classi¯ed into zones that switch from DST to ST,
while 2:7 percent are in identi¯able zones that remain on ST all year.
5 Do Cues Matter?
As a set of initial examinations we consider whether the ATUS data show evidence that
the cues of time zone, television and daylight matter.6 Finding di®erences in the timing
of activities across time zones would not demonstrate the importance of coordination and
its determinants through external cues. Rather, inferring their existence is possible only if
we see behavior that is consistent with the generation of di®erential cues across time zones
arising from the timing of television broadcasts, variation in daylight, and the relation of
real to nominal times across the zones.
6We ignore di®erences in timing that may arise from variations in the weather. These may a®ect day-
to-day variations in individual labor supply (see Connolly (2005)), but are hardly likely to alter long-term
di®erences across regions. Average climates across time zones in the contiguous United States do not di®er
greatly, in any event, as the time zones run within roughly the same ranges of latitude.
105.1 A Natural Experiment
As we noted above, Arizona, Hawaii and much of Indiana do not go on DST. Thus while the
rest of the nation is on DST, these areas are respectively 3, 6 and 1 hours behind Eastern
time; while the rest of the nation is on ST, they are respectively only 2, 5 and 0 hours
behind Eastern time. Moreover, in each of the non-daylight saving locations, as in the rest
of the nation, the nominal time at which television broadcasts appear does not change during
the year in response to nominal time changes. Thus for example, Arizona is essentially on
Mountain time during the winter, but is on Paci¯c time during the summer when it does not
\spring forward" with the rest of the Mountain time zone. However, its television schedules
remain at the nominal Mountain times. This allows us to construct a double-di®erence
estimator of the e®ect an hour shift in time zone, holding nominal television times constant:
¢
2 = (pDST ¡ pST)exper ¡ (pDST ¡ pST)control (7)
where p is the proportion of individuals performing a particular activity during a 15-minute
interval, and exper indicates \experimental" locations that do not observe DST while control
locations do. ¢2 is a measure of the impact of the exogenous shock to cues in Arizona, Hawaii,
and Indianapolis that occurs when most of the U.S. resets their clocks for daylight saving
time. This shock, moreover, does not involve a change in the television cue.
Table 2 presents the estimated single- and double-di®erences describing sleep, work and
television time for the quarter-hour 7:30-7:45 a.m. and for sleep and television time at
10:30-10:45 p.m. The di®erences look quite similar at the quarter-hours adjacent to these
two. People in these three unusual localities are roughly 50 percent more likely to be working
early in the morning when the rest of the country is on DST than when the entire nation is
on ST. Moreover, in the rest of the country there is no seasonal di®erence in the propensity
to work at this early hour. Together these single-di®erences generate a double-di®erence
11that is large and highly signi¯cant statistically.
The ability of workers in these areas to shift their schedules is generated mainly by their
choosing to alter their sleep patterns. The fraction of respondents who are still asleep at
7:30 a.m. in these areas is much lower when the rest of the country is on DST than when it
is on ST. The fraction asleep at 10:30 p.m. is only slightly higher on those days, but in the
rest of the country fewer people are asleep when DST is in e®ect than during ST. Thus the
double-di®erences on the timing of sleep are statistically signi¯cant, and they too indicate
the role of the bene¯ts of coordinating work activities with the rest of the country.
While the rest of the country is slightly (but signi¯cantly) more likely to watch television
in the late evening during DST, the experimental areas are less likely to watch than when
DST prevails elsewhere. Since the nominal timing of television programs does not change
over the year, this shifting of viewing habits is also consistent with the changed cue resulting
from the bene¯ts of inter-regional coordination of work timing.
The time-zone cue clearly changes di®erentially between the area that remains on ST
all year and the rest of the country. Given the more southerly location of the areas that
are always on ST, whether the e®ects of the daylight cue change di®erentially over the year
depends on the timing of these activities in response to changes in the amount of daylight. It
is unclear a priori in what direction these e®ects might go. To examine whether our results
are being generated by the bene¯ts of coordinating work inter-regionally or from local cues
from daylight, we restricted the sample to the 106 days in the two years during ST when the
amount of daylight was the same as that on the 106 days when most of the nation was on
DST. We then recalculated ¢2 for this reduced sample.
When we quarter the samples so that both television cues and light cues are held constant,
the point estimates hardly change. The adjustments in schedules in the areas that do not
switch to DST result from the bene¯ts of coordinating work schedules with the rest of the
country, not from di®erences in available daylight between ST and DST (and clearly not
12from television schedules, since the latter do not change over the year).
5.2 Separating the Cues
While our double-di®erence estimates of the e®ect of remaining on standard time suggest
that coordination with other regions is a signi¯cant determinant of schedules, they do not
address the impact of local cues on coordination. In order to take the three cues (time
zone, television zone, and sunlight) into account simultaneously, we use probit models for
each of the 96 ¯fteen-minute periods into which we use the ATUS to divide the day. The
cue variables are: time-zone cue, which is 0 for the Eastern time zone, 1 for Central, 2 for
Mountain, and 3 for Paci¯c; tv cue, which is 0 for the two coasts and 1 for the middle of the
country (where television schedules are an hour earlier nominally); and, sunrise and sunset,
which measure the hour of the observation day when the National Observatory calculates
that each occurred.7 We also include various demographic variables as well as one-digit
occupation and industry indicators in the work probits. Finally, we control for the total
number of minutes in the day devoted to a given activity, allowing us to isolate the impact
of these cues on scheduling, holding total consumption of the particular activity constant.8
Table 3 reports estimates of the average marginal e®ect from representative probits for
television viewing, sleeping, and working, Monday through Friday at two early-morning and
one late-evening time. (The results are qualitatively the same for quarter hours near those
included in Table 3.) Note that the sample in the work probits is restricted to those who
worked at some point during the observation day. Not surprisingly, the more time in the day
a person devotes to television, sleep, or work, the more likely he is to be performing each
activity at any given time. However, holding total consumption constant, we ¯nd that the
probability that an individual is watching television between 11 and 11:15 p.m. decreases
7The variables time-zone cue and tv cue describe the four time zones. If we replace these two by indicator
variables for three time zones, likelihood ratio tests do not imply an improvement in our ability to describe
variations in the probabilities.
8The central results change only slightly if these totals are not held constant.
13with age, while the probability that he is awake between 7 and 7:15 a.m. and at work
between 8 and 8:15 a.m. increases until retirement age. In addition, as education levels
increase, individuals are more likely to be watching television at a late hour, more likely to
sleep in, and less likely to be at work early.
Marital status and children do not appear to have any impact on the scheduling of
television viewing at 11 p.m., but married individuals are less likely to be sleeping at 7
a.m. and more likely to be at work at 8 a.m., an e®ect that is magni¯ed considerably for
married males. Finally, to save space, indicator variables for industry and occupation are not
reported for the work probits, but their estimated coe±cients suggest the expected results.
Individuals whose occupation is maintenance, management, business, or ¯nancial-related
tend to be at work early, while those who are in sales and services are less likely to be at
work at 8 a.m.. By industry, those employed in agriculture, mining, construction, and public
administration are more likely to be at work at 8 a.m. than workers in other sectors.
Turning to the cues, individuals who are in the early television zones are about 5 per-
centage points less likely to be watching television between 11 and 11:15 p.m. than those
who are in later television zones (for whom the late news is just beginning). Given that
about 17 percent of people in the East are watching television at this time, this corresponds
to nearly a one-third drop in the proportion viewing television in the middle of the country,
bolstering our assertion that television schedules serve as a cue for intra-regional coordina-
tion, as people in earlier television zones tend to watch television earlier. Moreover, for a
one-hour shift west in time zone, individuals are about 1 percentage point less likely to be
watching television at this time. Finally, as the sunset gets later, people are more likely to
be up watching television at 11 p.m., but the magnitude of the e®ect is quite small. If sunset
is pushed back by an hour, the probability of watching television at 11 p.m. only increases
by about half a percentage point.
While the e®ects of sunrise and sunset cues are minimal for all three activities, those of
14work and television cues are large. Individuals in the early television zones are 3.9 percentage
points less likely to be asleep at 7 a.m. and 3.5 percentage points more likely to be at work at
8 a.m. In addition, for a one-hour increase (shift west) in the time zone cue, the probability
of being asleep then drops by 1.6 percentage points, although there is no signi¯cant e®ect
on the timing of work.
Within each time zone, both the television cue for intra-regional coordination and the
time zone cue for inter-regional coordination help to determine scheduling. As a linear
approximation, compared to the Eastern time zone, an individual in the Central zone is, on
average, 5.4 percentage points more likely to be awake at 7 a.m. and an individual in the
Mountain zone is 7.0 percentage points more likely to be awake. While the television cue
for those in the Paci¯c time zone is identical to that in the East, the e®ect of being three
hours earlier leaves residents there 4.7 percentage points more likely to be awake at this time
than those in the East. These e®ects are quite large relative to the roughly 34 percent of
easterners who asleep between 7 and 7:15 a.m. Central time zone inhabitants di®er from the
East primarily because of their earlier television schedule, while residents in the Paci¯c time
zone di®er in their schedules due to the combined e®ects being three time zones away from
the East.
Turning to all 96 periods in the day, the estimated average marginal e®ects and 95{percent
con¯dence bands for the cues are presented in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 summarizes how both
natural and arti¯cial cues a®ect sleep schedules. Sunlight and circadian rhythms have the
anticipated e®ects on sleep scheduling. If sunrise occurs one hour later, sleep probabilities
are higher in the morning and lower in the evening as people shift their schedules later.
Similarly, if sunset occurs one hour later, people again rise later and go to sleep later. It is
arti¯cial rather than natural cues, though, that have the larger e®ects. Being in the early
television zones of the United States makes one signi¯cantly more likely to be awake in the
morning and less likely to be awake in the evenings. The relative probability of being asleep
15in the evening for the early TV zones begins to spike at 10 p.m. with the end of prime time
there, but it peaks at 11 p.m. as prime time ends on the coasts. At this time, people in the
center of the country are 10 percentage points more likely to be asleep than people on the
coasts, demonstrating the importance of television cues to sleep schedules. Turning to the
time-zone cue, we see that for a shift one time zone west (to an earlier nominal schedule),
individuals are less likely to be sleeping in the morning and more likely to be sleeping in the
evening, holding television schedules constant. While the e®ects of this cue for coordination
with other regions are signi¯cant, they tend to be about half the magnitude of the television
cue for intra-regional coordination.
Figure 5 shows the marginal e®ects of the same cues on the timing of work. Although
the trends for sunlight cues are again as anticipated| later sunrises or sunsets result in later
starting times and ending times of work| the individual e®ects are insigni¯cant. Similarly,
a hour shift west to an earlier time zone leads to being at work earlier and leaving earlier;
but, again, most of the individual e®ects are insigni¯cant. Estimates of the e®ect of the
television cue on work, however, show an interesting pattern. Individuals in the middle of
the country are as much as 3.5 percentage points more likely to be working at 8 a.m. and
as much as 3 percentage points less likely to be working at 5:30 p.m. However, there is a
dramatic downward spike in the middle of the workday. People in early television zones are
far less likely to be working at mid-day than people on the coasts. One possible explanation
is that people in the center of the country may work closer to home or to other locations
where they take a non-working lunch break, while people on the coasts may be more likely to
live in large cities where commuting home for lunch is di±cult. However, linking these data
to 2000 Census data on commuting times by MSA suggested that this explanation could not
be accounting for much of the di®erence. Another explanation is that because they arrive at
work earlier, these groups also eat lunch earlier in the day. If we examine the timing of other
activities, we ¯nd that indeed the probability of eating at this time is signi¯cantly higher in
16the central regions than on the coasts.
6 Are Some Groups More Responsive to Cues?
Thus far we have observed average sleep and work coordination both within and between
regions of the country for the population as a whole. As our theoretical discussion implied,
however, the returns to coordination may vary across demographic groups. Motivated by this
prediction, we ask four questions about demographic di®erences in cue sensitivity: Do single
people respond di®erently to coordination cues than people who share a household with
somebody? Are the e®ects of time zone cues on sleep scheduling stronger for the employed
than for those who are not working? Are people who do not watch television still responsive
to television cues? Does responsiveness to cues di®er by industry?
6.1 Household Status
Our model assumes that scheduling decisions are in°uenced by returns to both intra- and
inter-regional coordination as well as by taste factors such as a desire to be at home with fam-
ily at certain times. Individuals who have fewer personal or household scheduling demands
may therefore be more strongly in°uenced by cues for intra- and inter-regional coordination.
Figure 6 shows the relative impacts of television and time-zone cues on scheduling deci-
sions by people who are married and/or who have children under 17 living in the household
(\non-singles") and for \singles," who are not married and do not report living with chil-
dren.9 Looking at sleep scheduling, we see that the e®ects of time zone on sleep are virtually
identical throughout the day for both singles and non-singles. The e®ect of television cues
tends to be stronger for non-singles than for singles, however. As an example, at 7 a.m.
there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the proportion of singles who are sleeping on the coasts
9We also analyzed this by further decomposing non-singles into two groups: married with no children and
living with children. These two groups looked fairly similar to each other in terms of their responsiveness to
cues.
17and in the center of the country. Married people in the center of the country are a signif-
icant 2.8 percentage points less likely to be sleeping at this time. It seems plausible that
non-singles are engaging in greater household coordination and that, in particular, they are
more likely to watch television with others, amplifying the e®ects of television cues rather
than dampening them.
Turning to the work schedules of singles and non-singles, for much of the day we see
little di®erence in responses to cues. At certain key times, however, there is some evidence
that singles are more responsive to cues for intra- and inter-regional coordination than are
non-singles. In particular, note that at 7 a.m. there is no signi¯cant e®ect of television cues
on work probabilities for non-singles, while singles are 3.7 percentage points more likely to
be at work if they live in the early television zones. Looking at time zone, at 5 p.m. there
is no signi¯cant e®ect of time-zone cues on work probabilities for non-singles, while singles
are 1.8 percentage points less likely to be working at this time.
6.2 Employment Status
We have assumed throughout that it is the need for work coordination across time zones that
drives scheduling di®erences with each hour shift in time zone. If this is indeed the case, then
we would expect that individuals who are currently employed will be more responsive to the
time-zone cue than individuals who are not working. Figure 7 presents the marginal e®ect
of the time-zone cue on sleep probabilities for both groups of individuals. Contrary to our
expectations, employed persons are not uniformly more responsive. In particular, between
about 6 a.m. and 10 a.m. employed persons are notably less responsive to time-zone cues
than those who are not working. Perhaps this is because longitudinal cues operate through
more than returns to inter-regional work coordination and those with jobs have relatively
less scheduling °exibility than those who are not working. This would also be consistent
with the larger e®ects of cues on sleep schedules than on work schedules.
186.3 Television Viewership
The television cue is particularly interesting because it may directly a®ect scheduling for
viewers but, because of a need for intra-regional coordination, it may alter non-viewers'
schedules as well. By examining the relative responsiveness of viewers and non-viewers to
television cues, we can begin to separate the direct e®ect of the cue on scheduling from the
indirect e®ect that it provides through intra-regional coordination concerns. We divide our
sample into \viewers," who watch half an hour or more of television on the reference day (77
percent of the sample) and \non-viewers," who watch less than half an hour of television.10
Figure 8 shows the relative responsiveness to television cues in work and sleep scheduling by
these two groups.
Looking ¯rst at the e®ect of television cues on sleep schedules, we see that viewers tend
to be more in°uenced by these cues, but non-viewers are responsive as well. For example,
at 11 p.m., the peak of the spike induced by di®erences in prime-time television schedules,
television viewers in the middle of the country are 6.6 percentage points more likely to be
asleep than those on the coasts. The non-viewers in the middle of the country are 4.2
percentage points more likely to be sleeping than those on the coasts.
Turning to the e®ect of television cues on the work schedules of the two groups, the
pattern of di®erences is less readily discernable. When some pattern does seem manifest, it
suggests that non-viewers are actually more responsive to television cues in their morning
work schedules. Most of the di®erences between the two, though, are not signi¯cant.
6.4 Industry
It seems plausible that returns to local and external coordination might vary by industry
or occupation. We compare responsiveness for two relatively large industry groups: infor-
mation, ¯nancial, professional, and business services, hereafter called \business services"
10The results do not di®er greatly if we de¯ne non-viewers as those who watch less than one hour per day.
19(approximately 20 percent of sampled workers) and other service-related industries, which
include educational, health, leisure, and hospitality services (approximately 35 percent of
sampled workers).11 We expect that workers in the ¯rst group will be more likely to coordi-
nate inter-regionally than those in the second group.
Figure 9 shows the relative responsiveness of workers in these two industry groups to
local and external cues. As a whole, workers in the ¯rst group{ business services{ are
more responsive to time-zone cues for coordination, while workers in the second group{
other service industries{ are more responsive to television cues. For instance, looking at
responsiveness to time-zone cues at 10 p.m., for a one hour shift west in time zone, workers
in business services are 4.3 percentage points more likely to be sleeping, while workers in
other services are 2.0 percentage points more likely to be sleeping. Moreover, at 7 a.m., for
a one hour shift west in time zone, workers in business services are 2.7 percentage points
more likely to be at work, while workers in other services do not show a response. Examining
responsiveness to television cues, we see little di®erence for work activities. However, workers
in other service industries are more responsive to television cues in sleep scheduling than are
workers in business services. At 7 a.m., other service industry workers in the middle of the
country are 4.8 percentage points less likely to be sleeping than those on the coasts while
the e®ect for business service workers is 3.6 percentage points.
These relative di®erences suggest that workers in business services have higher returns to
inter-regional coordination and lower returns to intra-regional coordination than do workers
in other service industries. They provide direct evidence of the role of an increase in ®i in
our model. That workers in other services do show some response to time-zone cues may be
due to the existence of a direct return to inter-regional coordination or could simply re°ect
the need to coordinate with other local workers who, in turn, have gains to inter-regional
11More speci¯cally, `business services' include the 2002 Census industry codes 6470{6780, 6870{7190, and
7270{7790. `Other services' include industry codes 7860{8470, 8560{8690, and 8770{9290.
20coordination.
7 A Natural Experiment in Australia
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia are the only countries other than
the U.S. that have two or more time zones and that thus allow the kind of analysis we have
undertaken here. In order to examine the robustness of our results, we thus take advantage of
the Australian Time Use Survey of 1992 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1993), a random
strati¯ed sample of roughly 7000 individuals on two days each. Individuals listed when
they began a new activity, with responses then coded into 280 categories of activities. The
activities could encompass as few as 5 minutes, with the upper bound being the full 24 hours.
There are three time zones in Australia, but unfortunately the data set only gives identi-
¯ers for the three largest states, New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC) and Queensland
(QLD), all of which are in the same time zone (GMT+10). Fortunately, however, while the
¯rst two of these go on DST at the end of October and return to ST at the end of March,
Queensland remains on ST all year long. Moreover, the survey collected data in four two-
week periods over the year, including February 24 through March 7, when the two biggest
states were on DST, and September 28 through October 10, when they were not. Because
the main cities in each state are at nearly identical longitudes, and because these two two-
week periods stand in the same relation to the nearby equinoxes, during these periods the
times of sunrise and sunset di®ered among the three cities by no more than eight minutes.
Times of sunrise and sunset thus provide no di®erences in cues across the three states.
The longest-operating television stations in Australian are those a±liated with the Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Corporation. As television was growing up in Australia, the ABC made
the decision to broadcast its programs at the same nominal time in each state. Thus, for
example, the nightly news is presented at the nominal time of 10 p.m. in all states, regardless
of time zone or the existence of DST. There is thus no television cue in Australia. The only
21cue that matters is time zone, including the existence or lack thereof of DST. We can thus
isolate the e®ect of time zone in this sample by comparing Queensland to the other two large
states, during the period when the latter are on DST and during the period when they are
not. Indeed, the comparison is identical to the natural experiment analyzed in Section 5,
with QLD substituted for Arizona-Indianapolis-Hawaii, and NSW and VIC substituted for
the rest of the United States.
Table 4 presents calculations for weekdays in Australia that are analogous to those we
presented in Table 2. We calculate single- and double-di®erences for the same time periods,
and the same three activities-sleeping, working and television watching-that we include in
that table. The samples sizes for NSW and VIC are much smaller than those for the rest
of the U.S. in the ATUS, so that standard errors on the single- and double-di®erences are
larger than in Table 2. The estimates, however, have identical implications. When NSW
and VIC go on DST, residents of Queensland wake up earlier and go to sleep earlier, and
shift their television watching from late evening to early morning, compared to what was
observed when all three states were on ST. The directions of the e®ects are nearly identical
to those found in the American experiment.12 Clearly, the U.S. results do not result from
anomalies particular to our data or to the U.S.
8 Conclusion
We have investigated how and why synchronicity might arise through responses to both
local and inter-regional cues. Of course, synchronous behavior will be productive because
of complementarities in generating output and consuming goods and services; but the exact
nature of the jointness of timing does not simply arise randomly| it may be a®ected by
12The impacts on work timing are smaller than in Table 2 for the U.S., partly because relatively few
Australians are at work at 7:30 a.m. If we estimate the double-di®erence in the fraction of people at work
between 8:00 a.m. and 8:05 a.m., it becomes .029, much closer to, albeit still smaller than the e®ect in the
U.S.
22natural factors such as sunlight and by man-made changes such as time zones and television
schedules. The latter may arise from decisions that were made independent of any consider-
ations of their impacts on the timing of activities, or they can be instruments through which
policy might operate to alter behavior.
Because of its vast distances, both north-south and east-west, and because of political
decisions taken nearly a century ago, examining the timing of the three most important (in
terms of time spent) activities that people undertake| sleep, work and television-watching|
in the U.S. o®ers the opportunity to analyze potential cues for coordination. Our results,
using the ¯rst large-scale data set providing information on how Americans spend their time,
indicate that the natural cue of daylight has some e®ects, and that the entirely arti¯cial cue
of the timing of television programs has still larger e®ects on the coordination of activities.
Impacts of the bene¯ts of coordinating the timing of activities across time zones are also
apparent throughout. For instance, our estimates indicate that in response only to arti¯cial
cues, residents of the Central time zone are 16 percent more likely to be awake at 7 a.m. than
residents of the Eastern time zone, with about 2=3 of the e®ect attributable to di®erences
in television schedule and 1=3 of the e®ect attributable to the di®erence in time zone.
While the roles of these three cues for coordination{ sunlight, television, and time zone{
are evident, there is little sign that their importance di®ers greatly across individuals who
di®er in their marital status or employment status. Television viewers appear to be slightly
more responsive to television cues, but non-viewers also react. There are some di®erences
across industry and occupation, but all show similar trends of responsiveness. In those
industries, however, that we would think would require more inter-regional contacts, we do
in fact ¯nd greater impacts of time zones. Nonetheless, by inference one must conclude that
other factors, perhaps social norms, that are established by natural cues, by the bene¯ts
to inter-regional coordination of employment, and by television programming dominate any
consistent individual variations.
23Prompted by the recent rapid growth of surveys o®ering large samples of individuals
whose timing of activities is now available, research on the nature of temporal coordination
should burgeon in the next decade. Examining the synchronicity of activities is the obvious
complement to the vast literature on the quantity of di®erent activities, particularly those
in the market, that has been such a huge component of labor economic and macroeconomic
research.
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27Figure 3: Time Zones within the Contiguous United States
28Table 1: Population Distribution by Time Zone
Census Bureau ATUS
Time Zone 1920 2004 2003-2004
Eastern 50.1 44.7 45.9
Central 33.4 26.5 27.4
Mountain 3.4 4.3 4.7
Paci¯c 5.3 16.4 13.1
Non-Classi¯able 7.8 8.1 8.9
*Non-classi¯able states are AK, AZ, HI, IN, KY, and TN
29Table 2: Double-Di®erence Estimates of the E®ect of a Shock to the Time-Zone
Cue in the United States on Proportion Sleeping, Working, and Watching Tele-
vision
Experimental Locations Control Locations
(don't observe DST) (observe DST)
Time ST DST ¢ ST DST ¢ ¢2
7:30-7:45 a.m.
Sleep 0.303 0.247 -0.056 0.318 0.323 0.005 -0.061
(0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015)
Work 0.170 0.252 0.082 0.214 0.217 0.003 0.079
(0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014)
Television 0.046 0.035 -0.011 0.041 0.035 -0.006 -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
10:30-10:45 p.m.
Sleep 0.567 0.588 0.021 0.531 0.498 -0.033 0.054
(0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016)
Television 0.188 0.162 -0.026 0.211 0.222 0.011 -0.037
(0.018) (0.017) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014)
number obs. 460 491 15;589 18;153
*Bold di®erence estimates are signi¯cant at 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.




coef se coef se coef se
hours tv 0.0318 0.0009 - - - -
hours sleep - - 0.0701 0.0042 - -
hours work - - - - 0.0625 0.0015
age 20{29 -0.0235 0.0130 0.0462 0.0183 0.1389 0.0280
age 30{39 -0.0297 0.0129 -0.0427 0.0168 0.1909 0.0281
age 40{49 -0.0329 0.0127 -0.0556 0.0165 0.1780 0.0295
age 50{59 -0.0418 0.0119 -0.0714 0.0157 0.1856 0.0277
age 60{69 -0.0437 0.0118 -0.0072 0.0173 0.1689 0.0268
age >70 -0.0537 0.0108 -0.0065 0.0164 0.1336 0.0356
educ 12 0.0604 0.0110 0.0384 0.0116 -0.0048 0.0200
educ 13{15 0.0725 0.0117 0.0538 0.0120 -0.0470 0.0208
educ 16 0.1186 0.0142 0.0238 0.0131 -0.0484 0.0227
educ >16 0.1321 0.0168 0.0316 0.0150 -0.0689 0.0255
married -0.0040 0.0074 -0.0243 0.0092 0.0399 0.0136
male 0.0125 0.0078 0.0072 0.0098 -0.0148 0.0152
married¤male -0.0039 0.0104 -0.0371 0.0132 0.0231 0.0192
kids age 0-5 -0.0105 0.0071 -0.0044 0.0090 -0.0485 0.0114
kids age 6-17 -0.0020 0.0059 -0.0709 0.0081 0.0168 0.0096
black 0.0109 0.0082 0.0145 0.0106 -0.0138 0.0156
other -0.0104 0.0161 0.0814 0.0227 -0.0781 0.0289
hispanic -0.0099 0.0088 0.0105 0.0112 -0.0133 0.0161
year 2004 -0.0056 0.0052 -0.0136 0.0066 0.0045 0.0094
Cues
tv cue -0.0519 0.0053 -0.0385 0.0070 0.0354 0.0099
time-zone cue -0.0128 0.0025 -0.0157 0.0032 0.0069 0.0046
hour of sunrise 0.0051 0.0046 0.0069 0.0060 -0.0050 0.0083
hour of sunset 0.0081 0.0025 0.0065 0.0032 -0.0034 0.0045
number obs. 16,604 16,604 8,249
*Bold coe±cients are signi¯cant at 5% level. Standard errors are robust.
**Work probits also included indicator variables for industry and occupation.
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*95% confidence bands surround marginal effect estimates.
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37Table 4: Double-Di®erence Estimates of the E®ect of a Shock to the Time-Zone
Cue in Australia on Proportion Sleeping, Working, and Watching Television
Experimental Locations Control Locations
(don't observe DST) (observe DST)
Time ST DST ¢ ST DST ¢ ¢2
7:30-7:35 a.m.
Sleep 0.476 0.334 -0.041 0.566 0.584 0.018 -0.059
(0.029) (0.024) (0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.044)
Work 0.062 0.084 0.022 0.081 0.096 0.015 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.023)
Television 0.029 0.062 0.033 0.073 0.050 -0.023 0.056
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019)
10:30-10:35 p.m.
Sleep 0.544 0.566 0.024 0.515 0.441 -0.074 0.098
(0.028) (0.024) (0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.044)
Television 0.186 0.153 -0.033 0.173 0.222 0.050 -0.082
(0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.033)
number obs. 307 419 891 1124
*Bold di®erence estimates are signi¯cant at 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
38